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Monitoring, Inspection and Complaints Adjudication in Prison: 
The Limits of Prison Accountability Frameworks 
 
Cormac Behan and Richard Kirkham 
Cormac Behan is Lecturer in Criminology and Richard Kirkham is Senior 
Lecturer in Law, University of Sheffield 
Abstract: This article examines the framework for prison accountability in England and 
Wales, the Republic of Ireland and Scotland. Despite variations in both policy and practice 
between the three jurisdictions, what is striking are the similarities in their shortcomings. 
These deficiencies, whether based on real or perceived grievances, potentially undermine 
efforts to call prison governance to account. The article argues that not only should the 
primary bodies involved in prison accountability be independent and robust, for prisoners to 
experience these bodies as legitimate, transformational changes in penal culture and internal 
prison power dynamics must be addressed. 
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It is widely accepted that upon incarceration, the burden on the State is to provide a 
meaningful institutional framework which allows prisoners to assert or protect their rights 
(European Prison Rules 2006; United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners 1957, 2015). To address this responsibility, the Republic of Ireland, England and 
Wales, and Scotland have all adopted a tripartite structure of independent prison 
accountability; one built around systems and institutions of monitoring, inspection and 
FRPSODLQWV DGMXGLFDWLRQ KHUHDIWHU WKH µWULSDUWLWH PRGHO¶ Monitoring arrangements have 
developed with local citizen input. Inspectorates have been set up to provide autonomous 
oversight. The complaint system has been premised on the desirability of establishing 
independent statutory prisoner ombudsman schemes. 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of independent oversight, this article interrogates the 
extent to which we can expect the tripartite model WR SURWHFW SULVRQHUV¶ ULJKWs. Through a 
review of evidence of the performance within the tripartite model as it operates in England 
DQG:DOHVWKH5HSXEOLFRI,UHODQGDQG6FRWODQGKHUHDIWHUWKHµWKUHHMXULVGLFWLRQV¶LW makes 
the argument that, despite differences in design, there are marked similarities in the problems 
experienced in securing prisoner confidence in the tripartite model. These problems impact 
on prisoner engagement with the bodies designed to protect them and subsequently affect 
their capacity to secure redress. In this article we suggest that the main explanation for the 
problems with existing accountability structures may lie not in their design features, but in 
the need to address penal culture and power imbalances. 
This article begins by sketching out the distinct form of prison accountability in all three 
jurisdictions (Section A). A theoretical defence of the WULSDUWLWH PRGHO¶V FDSDFLW\ ERWK WR
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protect prisoner rights and enhance the legitimacy of prison governance is then offered 
(Section B) before the article analyses evidence (or absence of) as to its effectiveness 
(Section C). We conclude by identifying possible reasons for the limitations of the tripartite 
model. We argue that while gains have been made through the construction of the tripartite 
model, for any accountability framework to be fully effective it will require penal culture to 
be transformed to allow for complaining to be viewed as a positive expression of purposeful 
activity. This argument goes beyond binary judicial and administrative processes, and relates 
to recent work which highlights the importance of deliberative processes within prisons to 
engage prisoners and engender legitimacy (Section D). 
A. Monitoring, Inspection and Complaint-handling in the Three Jurisdictions 
In the three jurisdictions, a common tripartite institutional approach has come to dominate the 
accountability frameworks around prisons. Although the pace of adoption has varied, within 
this approach three separate mechanisms are relied upon to uphold prisoner rights. These 
mechanisms are introduced here. 
Monitoring 
In all three jurisdictions, some form of independent prison monitoring arrangement operates. 
Monitoring arrangements are based on local citizens entering prisons on a regular basis to 
meet with prisoners and thereafter reporting their findings both to prison officials and 
government. Prison monitors are generally concerned with low-level issues (which can take 
on a much greater importance in prison), such as loss of prisoner property, education and 
purposeful activity, resettlement and sentence planning. For monitoring purposes, the 
Republic of Ireland has visiting committees for each prison, whose members are appointed by 
the Minister for -XVWLFH7KHLUUROHLVµIURPWLPHWRWLPHDQGDWIUHTXHQWLQWHUYDOVWRvisit the 
prison in respect of which they are appointed and there to hear any complaints which may be 
PDGH WR WKHP E\ DQ\ SULVRQHU¶ 3ULVRQV 9LVLWLQJ Committee) Act 1925, Section 3(1)(a)). 
Visiting committees attend prisons on a regular, usually monthly, basis and each committee 
issues an annual report to the Minister for Justice which is later published.  
 
In Scotland in 2015, a review of its obligations under the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) 
led to the creation of independent prison monitors for each institution whose functions are 
somewhat similar to the former visiting committees. This new prison monitoring regime is 
under the direction of the Chief Inspector of Prisons who appoints at least three Prison 
Monitoring Co-ordinators who are paid and report directly to her/him. These Prison 
Monitoring Co-ordinators, in turn, appoint monitors to each prison, who are voluntary, to 
µPRQLWRUWKHFRQGLWLRQVLQWKHSULVRQDnd WKHWUHDWPHQWRISULVRQHUV¶3XEOLF6HUYLFHV5HIRUP
(Inspection and Monitoring of Prisons) (Scotland) Order 2014, Section 7d). In England and 
Wales, every prison has an Independent Monitoring Board (IMB). These replaced the former 
Boards of Visitors in 2003 and derive their responsibilities from the Prison Act 1952. IMB 
members are independent, unpaid and their role is to monitor the day-to-day life in individual 
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prisons and µHQVXUHWKDWSURSHUVWDQGDUGVRIFDUHDQGGHFHQF\DUHPDLQWDLQHG¶,QGHSHQGHQW
Monitoring Board 2015). If something serious happens at an establishment, for example a riot 
or a death in custody, representatives of the Board may be called in to attend and observe the 
way in which the situation is handled. 
Inspection 
The understanding that prisons should be exposed to regular scrutiny by an independent 
inspectorate is now firmly established in the three jurisdictions. Inspectorates are more 
powerful, professionalised and co-ordinated institutions than monitoring bodies, and also 
possess significantly larger budgets and extensive powers. Nevertheless, compared with 
monitoring systems, inspectorates have a less regular presence in prisons. A Prison 
,QVSHFWRU¶V UROH LV WR SURYLGH LQGHSHQGHQW VFUXWLQ\ RI WKH FRQGLWLRQV IRU DQG treatment of, 
prisoners and to issue reports on these conditions. While it is not the function of Inspectors to 
investigate or adjudicate on individual prisoner complaints, they can examine the general 
circumstances relating to the complaint. Broadly speaking, the design of the inspectorate 
schemes is similar in the three jurisdictions. In England and Wales, each prison is subject to 
monitoring by HM Inspectorate of Prisons under the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (Shute 2013). 
 
A similar form of inspectorate to that in England and Wales is in place in Scotland. 
Established in 1981 and placed on a statutory footing by the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989, Her 
0DMHVW\¶V &KLHI ,QVSHFWRU of Prisons for Scotland (HMCIPS) inspects prisons throughout 
Scotland in order to examine the treatment of, and the conditions for, prisoners. In the 
Republic of Ireland, the adoption of a modern inspectorate regime did not come until 2002 
when the first Inspector of Prisons was appointed. The Inspector issues an annual report on 
each prison inspected to cover, among other areas, general management, conditions and 
general health and welfare of prisoners, prison staff, programmes, security, discipline and 
compliance with national and international standards (Prisons Act 2007). In recent years, the 
role of the Inspector has evolved and s/he now investigates deaths in prison. 
Complaint-handling 
All three jurisdictions have a formal complaint-handling mechanism to deal with prisoner 
grievances, but the approach varies considerably. For reasons of speed, efficiency and good 
governance, it is considered best practice that initially complaints are resolved internally by 
the organisation from where they originated. Thus in the three jurisdictions, complaints can 
be heard internally by the governor/director or the prison monitors/visiting 
committee. If a complainant is dissatisfied with the outcome of the internal complaints 
process, the general expectation is that to provide the system with 
credibility there should be potential to access a fully independent body. Independence in the 
complaints process is normally provided by an ombudsman scheme (for example, 
Ombudsman Association 2015). In the three jurisdictions, however, only the Scottish Public 
Services Ombudsman (SPSO) provides a prison ombudsman service which is autonomous of 
the executive. In England and Wales, the equivalent generalist Parliamentary Ombudsman 
scheme has had the power to investigate complaints from prisoners since 1967 but for a 
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variety of reasons, it has only rarely been used (Seneviratne 2010, pp.12±13). Following the 
Woolf Inquiry into riots at Strangeways and other prisons in 1990, among other serious 
concerns identified was the lack of accessible independent redress (Woolf 1991). To address 
this problem a specialist ombudsman scheme for prisoners was established in 1994, but on a 
non-statutory basis and under the umbrella of the Ministry of Justice (Seneviratne 2010). A 
complainant who is dissatisfied with the way the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO) 
has dealt with their case can have it reviewed by another member of staff of the 
2PEXGVPDQ¶V 2IILFH ,I WKH\ DUH VWLOO GLVVDWLVILHG ZLWK WKH RXWFRPH WKH\ can request that 
their MP refer the case to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman.  
 
In contrast to the other two jurisdictions, as of 2016, Ireland did not have an independent end 
point to the complaints process for all complainants, which is one of the reasons it is a 
signatory to, but has not yet ratified OPCAT. Independent adjudication has been 
recommended (Inspector of Prisons 2012, p.21). While the Irish Prison Service has 
introduced a standardised internal prison complaints mechanism, only the most serious 
complaints will result in the appointment of external investigators on the decision of the 
Director General of the Irish Prison Service. After the Prison Rules 2007 were amended in 
IRU WKHPRVWVHULRXVFRPSODLQWVµ>W@KH,QVSHFWRURI3ULVRQVVKDOOKDYHRYHUVLJKWRIDOO
LQYHVWLJDWLRQV¶:KLOHWKH5HSXEOLF of Ireland does not have a designated prison ombudsman, 
the jurisdiction of the generalist parliamentary ombudsman scheme specifically excludes 
prisons (Ombudsman Act 1980, Section 5). Although not yet enacted, the proposal to remove 
this exclusion (Inspector of Prisons 2016) has been accepted by the Minister for Justice and 
Equality.  
 
B. Rationalising Prisoner Accountability Frameworks 
Inevitably, the frameworks through which prisoner rights are recognised and provided for 
have to be understood through the historical prism of local jurisdictions, and the above 
account identifies some significant variables. But the degree of consistency in the model 
adopted in the three jurisdictions points towards some clear similarities in the objectives 
being pursued. We suggest here that the dominance of the tripartite model in the three 
jurisdictions is best justified by a particular form of legitimacy claim, one which implies a 
highly-procedural approach to realising prisoner rights. 
 
The Influence of International Law  
The tripartite model can be understood as mapping onto a considerable body of jurisprudence 
and literature on prisoner rights (see Easton 2011; Morgan 2000; Van Zyl Smit and Snacken 
 7KH OHYHOV DW ZKLFK SULVRQHUV¶ ULJKWV DUH JLYHQ UHDO H[SUHVVLRQ UHPDLQ FRQWHVWHG LQ
many societies,  but a multiplicity of international and European declarations and conventions 
KDYHPDGHUHIHUHQFHWRSULVRQHUV¶ULJKWVZKLOVWRWKHULQWHUQDWLRQDO agreements deal explicitly 
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with prisoners (for example, European Prison Rules (EPR) 2006; European Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1987; UN 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) 1984; OPCAT 2002). As well as laying out the rights of prisoners, 
international law gives attention to devising institutional safeguards and processes to prevent 
the abuse of those rights. Although not referred to explicitly, all the elements of the tripartite 
model of institutional oversight are promoted at international level. 
As has been described above, a key part of the institutional solution in the three jurisdictions 
has been the facilitation of regular visits by independent observers to monitor prison life. This 
practice is now supported by the Optional Protocol (2002) of the UN Convention Against 
Torture which requires each state to create its own National Preventative Mechanism (NPM) 
to carry out visits to places of detention, to monitor the treatment of, and conditions for, 
detainees and to make recommendations regarding the prevention of ill-treatment (Article 19). 
Likewise, all three jurisdictions have developed an independent inspectorate to undertake 
more methodical and intensive checks on the management and operation of prisons. This 
capacity is emphasised in the updated UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners 2015 (known DVWKHµ0DQGHOD5XOHV¶ZKLFKDOORZIRULQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDOSULVRQ
LQVSHFWLRQ WKH ODWWHU WREH µFRQGXFWHGE\DERG\ LQGHSHQGHQWRI WKHSULVRQ DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶
(Rule 83) with the objective of the inspHFWLRQV µWR HQVXUH that prisons are managed in 
accordance with existing laws, regulations, policies and procedures . . . and that the rights of 
SULVRQHUVDUHSURWHFWHG¶ (Rule 84). Similar statements can be found in the European Prison 
Rules (Rules 92±3).  
 
The third part of the tripartite institutional model is the complaints process, which the three 
jurisdictions have, to varying degrees, given gradually increased emphasis to in recent 
decades. The importance of complaint V\VWHPVDQGSULVRQHUV¶DZDUHQHVV of them, has also 
been identified in international declarations and conventions. The Mandela Rules 2015 state 
WKDW µLQIRUPDWLRQ VKRXOG EH JLYHQ WR SULVRQHUV DERXW WKHLU WUHDWPHQW DQG complaint 
PHFKDQLVPV¶RQDUULYDODWDSULVRQ5XOH3ULVRQHUVVKRXOG be able to make complaints 
internally to prison staff and the governor, and WR WKH ,QVSHFWRU RI 3ULVRQV RU µDQ\ RWKHU
inspecting officer freely and in full confidentiality, without the director or other members of 
the staff being SUHVHQW¶ 3ULVRQHUV¶ OHJDO advisors or families can also make complaints on 
their behalf (Rule 56). All of these points are further emphasised by the European Committee 
for Prevention of Torture (2015, p.19).  
The Limitations of the Courts 
Aside from international law, the move towards the tripartite model derives from an 
acceptance of the unfeasibility of relying upon the courts alone to provide adequate 
protection. In practice, there are very real limits to what we might expect of the courtroom in 
terms of both securing meaningful redress for an individual grievance, and obtaining long-
term change. In England and Wales, for instance, the claim has been made that one of the 
6 
 
UHDVRQVWKHFRXUWVKDYHEHHQUHOXFWDQWWRLQWHUYHQHLVEHFDXVHµ(QJOLVK prison legislation was 
not designed to VSHOORXWSULVRQHUV¶ULJKWVEXWUDWKHU HQDEOHJRYHUQPHQWWRPDQDJHLWVSULVRQV¶
(Van Zyl Smit 2007, p.580). For reasons of efficient governance, prison legislation often 
includes standards that are heavily qualified and leave much residual discretion to prison 
authorities to manage prisons. As a source of guidance, this approach to rule-making reduces 
the ability of the courts to advance the rights of prisoners, as the judiciary generally exercises 
deference towards the lawful discretionary power of prison authorities. A consequence of this 
approach can be seen in the Republic of Ireland where the Irish courts have generally taken a 
µKDQGV RII¶ DSSURDFK WR SULVRQHUV¶ ULJKWV OHDYLQJ SULVRQ DXWKRULWLHV a wide level of 
interpretation in prison rules and institutional discipline (Hamilton and Kilkelly 2008, p.69). 
In the UK, high-profile cases exist LQZKLFKSULVRQHUV¶ ULJKWV KDYHEHHQ DGYDQFHG VXFKDV
Napier v. Scottish Ministers UK ([2005] ScotCS CSIH_16), around conditions in Barlinnie 
Prison in Scotland, and Edwards v. UK 46477/99 ([2002] ECHR 303), around the duty of 
care and protection of prisoners. But these are offset by cases which have demonstrated a 
reluctance to intervene, such as R (on the application of BP) v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department ([2003] EWHC 1963 (Admin)), dealing with the amount of time held in 
segregation, and Broom v. Secretary of State of the Home Department ([2002] EWHC 2041 
$GPLQ RQ SULYDF\ DQG FRQGLWLRQV LQ FHOOV $V (DVWRQ  FRQFOXGHV µVXFFHVV IRU
prisoners¶FODLPVRUDQLQWHUYHQWLRQist approach by the courts is by no means guaranteed as 
cases will turn on their own facts and weight will still be given to the needs of prison 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶SS±7).  
 
Notwithstanding the technical limits of the law as a rights protector, multiple procedural, 
practical and cost barriers also operate to make it difficult for prisoners to pursue a claim in 
court. Moreover, as a source of driving change, even if a prisoner is determined enough to 
continue with a complaint, initiate litigation, and have their rights upheld in court, thereafter, 
the courts do not always have the remedial powers to resolve issues, both individual and 
systemic. As a result of such inbuilt factors, relying upon the judiciary to develop a full body 
RISULVRQHUV¶ULJKWVLVD µVORZSURFHVVDQGRQHWKDWFRXOGHDVLO\EHUHYHUVHG¶9DQ=\O6PLW
2007, p.580). Nor does the law always capture the realities of day-to-day prison life, with 
mundane maladministration rarely a focus for the courts, precisely because the relevant 
standards are not confirmed in legislation. Consequently, the bar set by the courts to establish 
a grievance is likely to be high. Yet for most prisoners it will be relatively minor 
infringements of their rights that will be more likely to affect them. In summary, although 
PDQ\FDVHVRISULVRQHUOLWLJDWLRQKDYHEHHQKDUGZRQµWKHLUDFWXDOLPSDFW RQSULVRQHUV¶OLYHV
has been selective, and this highlights the difficulties of relying on the legal establishment to 
GHIHQG DQG GHILQH ULJKWV¶ &Drrabine et al. 2009, p.377). These are matters which the 
judiciary are confident in dealing with, such as correspondence with lawyers, access to courts, 
GLVFLSOLQDU\KHDULQJVDQG UHOHDVHSURFHGXUHV µ,QFRQWUDVW¶&DUUDELQH et al (2009) conclude 
WKDWµWKHcourts have not intervened in controversial administrative issues, such as transfers, 
segregation, and living conditions ZKLFK KDYH D GHELOLWDWLQJ HIIHFW RQ SULVRQHUV¶ S 
Even if individuals (inside or outside prison) had easy access to legal redress, it is highly 
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questionable whether it would be desirable to channel all rights protection through the courts. 
This would privilege professionalised activity and emasculate the agency of individual and 
collective action by citizens. Focusing on individual redress might be considered inefficient, 
as such an approach is reactive only when grievances are aired and does not necessarily lead 
to solutions that provide equivalent rights protection for the prisoner community (Deitch 
2012). Reliance on judicial oversight also risks drawing attention to, and concentrating 
resources towards, headline but low incident rights-breaches, and away from more subtle but 
high incident rights-interfering impacts on the prisoner experience. Judicial oversight, 
WKHUHIRUHµLVDPodel better suited for addressing extreme cases than for encouraging routine 
LPSURYHPHQWV LQ SULVRQ RSHUDWLRQV¶ 'HLWFK 2012, p.238). By contrast, more low-level and 
less confrontational institutional processes might offer a better model for changing practices 
and engaging the constructive co-operation of prisoners, prison staff and management. Where 
institutions are given a proactive remit, and individuals feel empowered enough to resolve 
issues informally, they also offer a mechanism to prevent independent redress being resorted 
to for more low-level breaches of rights. 
The Role of Watchdogs 
Partly in response to the practical limitations of judicial oversight, both the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland have looked to other solutions to assist in the protection of prisoner rights, 
in particular the non-judicial independent oversight of prisons. This approach embraces two 
core goals of (i) attempting to prevent breaches of prisoner rights occurring, and (ii) resolving 
individual grievances. A feature of the tripartite model is that it provides for an overlap in 
purpose and function between different models of watchdog. This is an approach known as 
µUHGXQGDQF\¶LQWKHUHJXODWRU\OLWHUDWXUHZKHUHE\WZRRU more institutions, adopting different 
methodological approaches, are used to promote broadly similar meta-objectives (Scott 2000). 
This approach has the perceived advantage that it reduces the potential for flaws in provision 
falling through gaps in accountability and is particularly important where the risks of abuse of 
power going undetected are high. On the prevention side, systems of inspection and 
monitoring maintain a flow of independently verifiable and transparent knowledge on 
conditions in prisons and information about the treatment of prisoners. Moreover, because the 
presence of monitoring regimes is relatively constant, the aim is that prison staff are 
incentivised to adhere to standards because of the enhanced likelihood of breaches being 
uncovered. Further, prisoners are, in theory, encouraged to take their rights capacity seriously, 
rather than being pounded into submission by the informal cultures of control in prisons 
(Dietch 2012).  
 
On the individual redress side, monitoring and complaints processes are utilised in 
combination to assist in enabling prisoners to access and pursue their grievances through 
processes less bound by hard law and more amenable in the consideration of soft breaches of 
prisoner rights. Both systems allow for independent agents to access prisoners in their own 
environment and assist them directly in understanding the nature of their problem and 
pursuing any grievances they may have. Additionally, due to their regular access with 
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multiple prisoner issues, monitors and complaint handlers both possess a store of information 
to feed back systemic lessons from their work to prison management and propose preventive 
measures for the future. 
Overall, therefore, the tripartite institutional model is designed to uphold prisoner rights on an 
ongoing basis, using a framework which supplements, and is supported by, the pre-existing 
judicial process. 
 
C. Procedural Fairness and the Tripartite Model 
The tripartite model is typical of modern governance arrangements, which tend to rely upon 
complex and overlapping networks of regulatory, and accountability methods and institutions 
to exert control over public institutions (Hood et al. 1999). In addition to the three 
institutional forms highlighted in this article, in all three jurisdictions a combination of 
management boards, auditors, parliamentary committees and government departments, also 
operate to promote good practice in prisons (Shute 2013). But the distinguishing hallmark of 
the tripartite model is its commitment to an ongoing input from, and interaction with, 
prisoners. The tripartite model, therefore, is not just aimed at building accountability in the 
sector, but it is also a co-ordinated endeavour to enhance the quality of justice, and in 
particular, the procedural fairness experienced by prisoners. There is now a rich body of work 
exploring the relationship between procedural fairness and legitimacy in criminological 
settings (for example, Crawford and Hucklesby 2013), with a few empirical studies focused 
specifically on applying the concept to prisons (Jackson et al. 2010; Franke, Bierie and 
Mackenzie 2010; Brunton-Smith and McCarthy 2015; Butler and Maruna 2016). Procedural 
fairness and legitimacy relates to the search for social order in the modern prison, which is a 
constant and central task of any prison administrator (Sparks, Bottoms and Hay 1996, p.1). 
Potentially, the tripartite model might assist in maintaining order within prisons by 
constructing a system of regulated authority that is capable of being perceived as 
procedurally fair by prisoners (Jackson et al. 2010, p.5). This, in turn, might be considered 
beneficial because the greater the perceptions of legitimacy the more likely it is that those 
bound by rules and control structures will obey them (Tyler 2006). Pragmatically this is an 
important outcome because of the various costs and inefficiencies involved in enforcing order 
in situations where those being controlled do not accept the legitimacy of prevailing 
regulatory structures (Tyler 2006). But procedural fairness is also important because it allows 
prisoners to experience respect for their agency (Tyler 2007, pp.115±24). 
 
The extent to which the goal of procedural fairness by itself is likely to be capable of securing 
legitimacy within a prison environment will be returned to shortly. But in this section the 
success of the tripartite model in promoting procedural fairness is examined. The foci of the 
examination are the key determinants of procedural fairness, as identified in the work of 
Tyler (2006). Thus the tripartite model might be argued to promote procedural fairness 
because jointly its institutions: (i) provide more opportunities for prisoners to have a voice; (ii) 
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increase access to neutral agents; (iii) promote treatment with respect and dignity; and (iv) 
aspire to enhance trust in authorities through increasing the rigour of external scrutiny 
(Brunton Smith and McCarthy 2016).  
 
For the purposes of this article, we undertook a review of reports emanating from, and about, 
the relevant institutions in the three jurisdictions. The research undertaken was focused 
largely on secondary sources (for example, reports from monitors, inspectorates and 
complaint-handlers), parliamentary hearings and empirical studies. What is noticeable is that, 
even though much of the body of material examined derived from the tripartite institutions 
across all three jurisdictions, who you might expect to promote their own effectiveness, the 
evidence pointed towards a number of common barriers to the full realisation of procedural 
fairness.  
Increasing Voice 
Procedural fairness is enhanced where processes enable participants to exercise their voice. In 
the context of the tripartite model, its institutions are specifically designed to facilitate 
grievance recognition and to allow prisoners to express their views and experiences, in 
particular with prison monitors. But in this respect, a recurring theme of reports on the sector 
has been a concern with the relative lack of engagement from sections of the prison 
community with the tripartite bodies. The most obvious challenge is addressing the lack of 
awareness amongst prisoners of the powers, functions and, in some instances, even the 
existence, of the accountability bodies involved. A particular problem lies with the 
Ombudsman (Seneviratne 2010, p.7), which is the least hands-on and visible institution in the 
sector, with some sections of the prison population much less represented in the complaint 
system than others. In their analysis of why women and young people are under-represented 
in the complaints it receives, the PPO found that this was due to, amongst other reasons, a 
lack of awareness of the office (Prisons and Probation Ombudsman 2015a). This same survey 
established that there was a much greater awareness of the IMBs, perhaps because the latter 
were more visible in the prison and engaged in immediate informal complaint resolution. 
 
In the Republic of Ireland, although a new complaint system is only in its infancy, the 
Inspector of Prisons has already expressed a similar set of concerns, highlighting the 
importance of µSULVRQHUV DQG VWDII DOLNH >KDYLQJ@ FRQILGHQFH LQ WKH V\VWHP¶ ,QVSHFWRU RI
Prisons 2014, pp.10±11). He found that prisoners do not complain for a variety of reasons, 
including a lack of confidence in the process, fear that they would be at a disadvantage with 
the prison system, fear of transfer, and in the most serious cases, concerns about their safety 
(pp.10±11). 
 
The nuanced layers of challenges involved in encouraging complaint handling are well 
documented. In Scotland, the SPSO (Scottish Public Services Ombudsman 2014) noted that 
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SULVRQHUVPD\µQRWEHDEOHWRDFFHVVFRPSODLQWVIRUPVDVUHDGLO\DVWKH\VKRXOGDQGWKDWWKHUH
may be some ZLGHU LVVXHV ZLWK DFFHVV WR WKH FRPSODLQWV SURFHVV¶ S ,QGHHG
communicating and informing prisoners of the activities and processes of the various 
accountability bodies is an ongoing challenge. To allow for easier communication by 
prisoners, the SPSO has a freephone number available in all institutions for contacting them 
in the first instance. But in all three jurisdictions prisoners have no, or limited, access to 
probably the most widely used method of information dissemination in the 21st Century, the 
Internet. This undermines one of the key communication strategies used by the tripartite 
bodies outside prison, all of which use websites to provide important information on their 
role, functions and powers. Problems of engagement by prisoners with the tripartite model 
may also be related to the low literacy levels among the prison population, ZKLFK µWHQG WR
have lower than average attainment and poor experiences RIFRPSXOVRU\HGXFDWLRQ¶7HWWet 
al. 2012, p.172). In England and Wales, 47% of prisoners report having no qualifications, 
compared with 15% of the working age general population. One in five prisoners need help 
with reading and writing or numeracy (Prison Reform Trust 2015, p.8). Another UK-wide 
study has indicated that between 20% and 30% of the prison population had learning 
difficulties or disabilities (Talbot 2008, p.3). In the Republic of Ireland, research on literacy 
levels among Irish prisoners showed that nearly 53% were in the level 1 or pre-level 1 
category (the highest is level 5) and that the average literacy level of the prison population 
was much lower than that of the general population (Morgan and Kett 2003, pp.35±6). Those 
with literacy difficulties can be expected to struggle with reading posters, advertisements, and 
filling out forms. They are also less likely to have the confidence to participate in the public 
sphere. In both the UK and the Republic of Ireland, the demographics of those incarcerated 
tend to be predominately young, urban males, with low levels of traditional educational 
attainment, and from lower socio-economic backgrounds (Prison Reform Trust 2015; 
2¶'RQQHOOet al. 2007). This subset of the population is, arguably, less equipped to engage 
with officialdom, and hence more likely to be marginalised. They are also less likely to 
complain than are those in other demographic groups, inside or outside the institution. 
Perception of Independence  
Access to independent bodies is a dominant theme in narratives on procedural fairness, as it 
reduces the potential for arbitrary decision making to be imposed. To varying degrees, each 
of the accountability bodies looked at in this study professes its independence within the 
limits of the legislation and/or prison rules. However, there have been charges that the 
tripartite bodies are too close to the institution that they are holding to account. Whether 
perceived or real, this perception can undermine these bodies if prisoners disengage as a 
result, potentially leading to reports providing a skewed perspective on penal institutions. A 
former Chief Inspector of Prisons in England and Wales expressed the view that his post 
should not be sponsored by the Ministry of Justice because of the problems of perception that 
creates (Hardwick 2015, pp.62±3). He also implied that sometimes the pressure from 
government can go straight to operational concerns (Hardwick 2015, 2016). The Justice 
Committee of the Westminster Parliament has echoed these concerns, recommending that the 
Inspector reports directly to Parliament (House of Commons Justice Committee 2015, p.63). 
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In the Republic of Ireland, the Inspector of Prisons reports to the Minister for Justice who 
may omit from the report any matter if, among other UHDVRQVVKHµLVRIWKHRSLQLRQ¶WKDWWKH
FRQWHQWVZRXOGEHµFRQWUDU\WRWKH public interest, or (ii) may infringe the constitutional rights 
RI DQ\ SHUVRQ¶ (Prisons Act 2007, Sections 31±2). Parts of thH ,QVSHFWRU¶V VHFRQG DQQXDO 
UHSRUWZHUHGHOHWHGIRUOHJDOUHDVRQV2¶'RQQHOOSPXFKWRWKH annoyance of the 
,QVSHFWRU ZKR UHFRPPHQGHG WKDW DOO KLV UHSRUWV µLQFOXGLQJ WKH DQQXDO UHSRUW PXVW EH
published without alteration unless such alterations are made with the consent of the 
Inspector and will be made RQO\RQVHFXULW\JURXQGV¶,QVSHFWRURI3ULVRQVS7KLV
method RISXEOLFDWLRQKDV OHG WR FDOOV WRKDYH WKH ,QVSHFWRU¶V UHSRUW LVVXHGGLUHFWO\ by the 
Office of the Inspector (Irish Penal Reform Trust 2009, p.9).  
3ULVRQHUV¶ ODFN RI DFFHVV WR DQ RPEXGVPDQ LQ WKH 5HSXEOLF RI ,UHODQG KDV OHG WR WKH
accountability mechanism coming in for widespread criticism. Access to an ombudsman was 
recommended by a government appointed committee of enquiry into the penal system over 
30 years ago (Whitaker 1985, p.16), a recommendation echoed by the Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (2007) and the Irish Penal Reform Trust (2009, Sµ6XFKDV\VWHP¶
the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (2007) FRQWHQGHG µZRXOG UHLQIRUFHSULVRQHUV¶
confidence in the complaints mechanism and also assist prison management to deal 
appropriately with that PLQRULW\RISULVRQRIILFHUVZKRRYHUVWHS WKHPDUN¶ S7KLVFDOO
has been repeated by the UN Human Rights Committee (2014, p.6). In terms of independence, 
Scotland is further ahead. In 2014, funding for the Chief Inspector of Prisons was taken from 
the Scottish Prison Service and is now allocated by the Scottish government (Public Services 
Reform (Inspection and Monitoring of Prisons) (Scotland) Order 2014, Section 6(8)). In the 
H[HUFLVHRIWKH6362¶VVWDWXWRU\IXQFWLRQVWKH6362 is not subject to the direction or control 
of any member of the Scottish Government (Scottish Public Services Ombudsman 2015). In 
contrast to other Ombudsman schemes, the SPSO is nominated by the Scottish parliament, 
and appointed by the Crown, for a period of not more than five years (Scottish Public 
Services Ombudsman Act 2002, Schedule 1). But this formalising of status does not 
necessarily resolve all problems by itself and minor things can get in the way of achieving the 
perception of LQGHSHQGHQFH ,Q WKH6362¶V FDVH IRU LQVWDQFH WKH VLPLODULW\RI WKHRIILFH¶V 
acronym to that of the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) was considered unhelpful and has 
subsequently led to a name change. Despite this, the SPSO KDVFODLPHGWKDWµLQPRVWFDVHV
the SPS complaints system is generally well understood and accessible, although we have 
some anecdotal evidence that there may be issues with access IRU VRPH SULVRQHUV¶
particularly concerning access to health care (Scottish Public Services Ombudsman 2014, 
p.6). 
Respect and Dignity 
Procedural fairness ideally enables an individual to feel that their issue is taken seriously. But 
two perennial problems that can undermine faith in watchdogs are their ability to process 
matters in a timely fashion and their capacity to secure action in response to their findings. 
Delays in processing complaints are a particular problem for an ombudsman, as before a 
12 
 
complaint is investigated by an ombudsman, it has to have gone through the internal 
complaints procedure. While the complaint-handlers undoubtedly need time to consider a 
case, the length of time needed can put prisoners off initiating a complaint. For example, in 
England and Wales, the average time taken from assessment to the end of the investigation 
for the PPO was 25 weeks (Prisons and Probation Ombudsman 2015b, p.15). However, in all 
three jurisdictions many committals to prison are for less than a year. In 2014, in the Republic 
of Ireland, 90% of those committed under sentence were for under one year, with the vast 
majority of these for under three months (Irish Prison Service 2015, p.27) (although many of 
these spent a shorter period in prison as they were committed to prison for the non-payment 
of a court-ordered fine). In England and Wales, nearly half (45%) of all people entering 
prison under sentence were serving a sentence of six months or less (Prison Reform Trust 
2015, p.2). In Scotland, the average length of a custodial sentence in 2012/13 was just over 
nine months (Prison Reform Trust 2014, p.9).  
While it may be in the interests of administrative justice to continue to pursue complaints 
even after a prisoner is released from custody, this is unlikely to happen. Therefore, these 
bodies, especially the ombudsman, may not necessarily be the most effective complaints 
resolution mechanisms. The PPO finding that women and prisoners in young offender 
institutions are less likely to complain (Prisons and Probation Ombudsman 2015a) may be 
related to the fact that these tend to have shorter sentences and µORQJ-term high-security 
prisoners are much more likely to complain than WKHLUVKRUWWHUPORZVHFXULW\FRXQWHUSDUWV¶
(Morgan and Liebling 2007, p.1117). 
 
Deborah Russo, the Joint Managing Solicitor for the Prisoners Advice Service, a charity 
SURYLGLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG OHJDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ IRU SULVRQHUV KDV FODLPHG WKH 332 µhas an 
incredible backlog, which renders the HQWLUHV\VWHPXQZRUNDEOH¶+RXVHRICommons Justice 
Committee 2015, p.62). While prison monitors/visiting committees tend to visit prisons 
regularly, it is the Ombudsman who deals with the most serious complaints and therefore, 
these might go unreported because the individual feels there is no point if s/he is released 
before the complaint is resolved. Concerns have also been expressed about the 
implementation of the findings of the tripartite bodies. In the Republic of Ireland, reports of 
YLVLWLQJFRPPLWWHHVKDYHEHHQGHVFULEHGDVµW\SLFDOO\ EULHIDQGEODQG¶ 2¶'RQQHOO
p.123) and the brevity of these reports leaves us with a lack of understanding of life in Irish 
prisons. They contain few details of visits undertaken, the nature of the complaints, and 
outcome (Irish Penal Reform Trust 2009, p.10). The Irish Penal Reform Trust has maintained 
the pressure for change and innovation, arguing that the government 
VKRXOG µUHYLHZ WKH H[LVWLQJ IXQFWLRQV DQG SRZHUV RI YLVLWLQJ FRPPLWWHHV DV well as the 
appointment and reporting process, with a view to strengthening their role as a lay monitoring 
PHFKDQLVP¶ ,ULVK3HQDO5HIRUP7UXVW 2009, p.12). Despite having their own websites and 
the reports being more robust, similar sentiments have been expressed by those who engaged 
with the IMBs. Paula Harriott, Head of Programmes at User Voice, a charity which works 
with prisoners and ex-SULVRQHUV µVXJJHVWHG WKDW SULVRQHUV have little faith in the wider 
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VFUXWLQ\SURFHVVRIWKHSULVRQV\VWHPLQFOXGLQJWKURXJK,0%V¶+RXVHRI&RPPRQV-XVWLFH
Committee 2015, p.60).  
Some of those involved in the accountability bodies have also expressed frustration that their 
efforts to improve prison conditions go unheard or LJQRUHG µ, NQRZ RI OLWWOH HYLGHQFH WKDW
IMB reports have a significant impact on NOMS or MoJ, or that changes are made in 
response to IMB MXGJHPHQWV¶ UHSRUWHG WKH &KDLU RI ,0% DW +03 7KDPHVLGH µ:H ZULWH 
annual reports to which NOMS and MoJ often respond inadequately. My impression is that 
DOWKRXJK UHSRUWV PD\ VRPHWLPHV EH IRXQG WR EH ³LQWHUHVWLQJ´, they are seldom felt to be 
³XVHIXO´¶ +RXVH RI &RPPRQV -XVWLFH Committee 2015, p.61). There is a fine line to be 
trodden as the issuing of critical reports, especially from Inspectors, can bring them into 
conflict with both the prison service and ministers who are responsible for it. But it does not 
necessarily help in the resolution of complaints from prisoners. And if prison inspectors are 
too critical of the standards they wish to have adhered to in institutions, this can lead to a 
falling out with government ministers and/or prison administrators (Ramsbotham 2003) 
which means that they can lose their effectiveness. Some scholars have argued that while the 
&KLHI,QVSHFWRU¶VUHSRUWVDWWUDFWZLGHVSUHDGPHGLDDWWHQWLRQZKLFK µFDQWKHUHIRUHSOD\DUROH
in highlighting poor practice and benchmarking unacceptable standards, as well as promoting 
JRRG SUDFWLFH DQG PDLQWDLQLQJ WKH TXDOLW\ RI VHUYLFHV¶ %HQQHWW  S RWKHUV KDYH
claimed that UHSRUWV µKDYH VRPHWLPHV ODFNHG SROLF\ LPSDFW¶ 0RUJDQ DQG Liebling 2007, 
p.1115). Similarly, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons found that a critical report did not always 
bring about change, with its conclusion, particularly in relation to deaths in custody, that 
µ>V@RPHSULVRQVFRQWLQXHGWRJLYHLQVXIILFLHQWDWWHQWLon to implementing and reinforcing the 
recommendations of WKH3ULVRQVDQG3UREDWLRQ2PEXGVPDQ¶+0&KLHI,QVSHFWRURI3ULVRQV 
for England and Wales 2015, p.35).  
Trust 
A key aspect of procedural fairness is the promotion of trust. Here too, however, there is 
evidence to suggest that the goal is not being fully fulfilled through the tripartite model. In his 
2014±15 Annual Report, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales (2015) 
admitted that µSULVRQHUVKDGOLWWOHFRQILGHQFHLQ WKHFRPSODLQWVV\VWHP¶S/LNHZLVH in 
research conducted in the Republic of Ireland, many prisoners were critical of both the 
Inspector of Prisons and the visiting committees (see Behan 2014, pp.164±72). One prisoner 
echoed what many of his fellow prisoners believed, thaW WKH,QVSHFWRU¶VUHSRUWVZHUHµVDGO\
just a paper H[HUFLVH¶7KHYLVLWLQJFRPPLWWHHFDPHLQIRUSDUWLFXODUFULWLFLVPLQFOXGLQJWKDW
it was too close to the prison authorities and it had little power to effect change. Another 
prisoner perhaps summed up the general attitude towards the visiting committee with his 
blunt assertion that they were an µDEVROXWHVKRZHURIXVHOHVVEDVWDUGV¶SS±72).  
 
Similar sentiments have been expressed in England and Wales with the Boards of Visitors 
(since replaced with IMBs). There were concerns WKDWWKH\VHHPHGµFRQWHQWWRSXUVXHDORZ
SURILOHDQGVRPHZKDWFRV\UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHSULVRQDXWKRULWLHV¶/LYLQJVWRQH2ZHQDQG
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McDonald 2008, pp.12±13). Although attempts have been made to improve accountability 
mechanisms in England and Wales, and despite a change in name from Boards of Visitors, 
and improvements such as publication of their UHSRUWVµLWLVQRWFOHDUWKDWWKHLUFUHGLELOLW\KDV
JUHDWO\ LPSURYHG¶ 0RUJDQ and Liebling 2007, p.1115). Nigel Newcomen, the Prisons and 
Probation Ombudsman (cited in Day, Hewson and Spiropoulos 2015, p.32) reported that he 
JHWVµDORWRIFRPSODLQWVDERXWWKHFRPSODLQWVV\VWHP¶  
I know that the inspectorate, when it surveys prisoners, finds that there is lack of 
confidence in the complaints system . . . Complaints in prison have a fundamentally 
important role in easing tensions and allowing people to feel that they are being 
treated justly. The independent element externally does that as well, and the IMB 
provide another level, but it is fair to say that it is not a subject of great confidence 
among prisoners. If it lacks confidence it will add to frustrations, and if it adds to 
frustrations that adds to problems for the prison itself. The issues outlined above 
undermine the legitimacy of the various institutions of the tripartite model and 
SRWHQWLDOO\UHGXFHSULVRQHUV¶HQJDJHPHQW with them.  
 
D. The Limitations of Accountability Frameworks 
It is not being argued in this article that the tripartite bodies have not and do not secure 
significant gains. As a former Chief Inspector of Prisons in England and Wales has noted, 
WKLQJVµZRXOGKDYHEHHQHYHQZRUVHZHUHLW QRWIRUXV¶+DUGZLFN1HYHUWKHOHVVWZR
claims are being made on the basis of existing evidence. First, the consistency of critiques 
across jurisdictions and institutions identified above requires an explanation and response. 
Our preliminary analysis is not sufficient to reveal fully the limitations in the tripartite model. 
Nevertheless, it does suggest that, given the strong reliance placed upon the institutions of 
SULVRQ DFFRXQWDELOLW\ WR VHFXUH SULVRQHUV¶ ULJKWV IXUWKHU independent empirical research is 
required to tease out the true added YDOXHWKDWVXFKLQVWLWXWLRQVSURYLGHIURPWKHSULVRQHUV¶
perspective. Second, it is being claimed that, as beneficial as the tripartite model might be, 
the underlying causes of prisoner scepticism are unlikely to be resolvable though operational 
reform alone. Thus, even if the tripartite model was fine-tuned to secure such attributes as 
clearer independence or improved awareness of their activities and powers, wider 
engagement amongst prisoners may be secured, but problems would remain. If correct, this 
implies that a more radical response is required, one which views the challenges within the 
sector as indicators of permanent tensions in the nature of the role facing those involved in 
the prison accountability framework. In this final section, it is argued that a way forward is to 
recognise that, just as with the judicial process, the tripartite model has its own inherent 
limitations which reduce its capacity to act as a rights-enhancing network. These limitations 
come not from within the design of the organisations themselves, but in the nature of the 
human and social challenge that they are charged with addressing.  
Power, Fear and Resignation As with any community setting, prison life involves an 
LQWHUSOD\RIWKHGLIIHUHQWSDUWLFLSDQWVLQDµFRPSOH[VRFLDOV\VWHPZLWKLWVRZQQRUPVYDOXHV 
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DQGPHWKRGVRIFRQWURO¶6\NHVS4). But unlike other community settings, prison is 
an institution that is built on peculiarly unequal power relations between captors and captives 
(Crewe 2011; Sykes 1958). In prisons, a culture operates to embed a deeply uneven 
distribution of power which places multiple barriers in the way of the successful operation of 
accountability mechanisms. This particular set of institutional circumstances and power 
dynamics make it more likely that incidents which may individually be reasonably considered 
as relatively minor matters, can cumulatively amount to persistent patterns of behaviour 
intended to cause considerable distress and anger to a prisoner (Inspector of Prisons 2012, 
p.28).  
A manifestation of this unequal power dynamic is the reluctance of prisoners to engage with 
softer forms of accountability offered within the tripartite model, because they fear the 
consequences of being labelled troublemakers. The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman 
(2015a) has found that some prisoners refused to complain because of fear of reprisal, in 
subtle forms, and the Irish Inspector of Prisons (2014) has received reports from prisoners 
WKDWWKH\GLGQRWPDNHFRPSODLQWVEHFDXVHWKH\µSHUFHLYHWKDW they will be at a disadvantage 
LQWKHSULVRQ¶S Notwithstanding the evolution of the tripartite model of accountability, 
therefore, in much of the available research literature on the life of prisoners, official and 
academic, a picture remains of a sense of fear and resignation that prevents many prisoners 
from complaining7KLVZDVH[SUHVVHGWR&DUUDELQHE\D%ULWLVKSULVRQHUµ\RX¶UHLQ
JDRO\RXGRQ¶W want to be there, but most prisoners want to get in, do their time and get RXW¶
(p.905). In one PPO study, one young participant said that even if he had a complaint, he 
ZRXOG µMXVWJHWRQZLWK LW¶ FLWHG LQ3ULVRQVDQG3UREDWLRQ2PEXGVPDQDS%RWK
women and young prisoners felt that because they had broken the law and ended up in prison, 
they did not have a right to complain and would just have to put up with ill-treatment (Prisons 
and Probation Ombudsman 2015a, p.14). There is a pervading sense that time in prison is to 
be endured and this should be done without attracting any attention to oneself. Do your time, 
keep your head down, do not complain and do not cause, or be seen to cause, any trouble. 
Compliance to prison regimes, therefore, may indicate resigned acceptance as much as 
evidence of procedural fairness. As Reisig and Mesko (2009, p.55) conclude in their study of 
legitimacy in an adult male prison in Slovenia, WKDW DFFHSWDQFH RI SULVRQ DXWKRULWLHV¶
GHFLVLRQVDQGREH\LQJSULVRQGLUHFWLYHVGRHVQRW IROORZ WKDW WKH\EHOLHYH WKH\DUH µPRUDOO\
FRUUHFW¶ 5DWKHU LW µPD\ UHIOHFW SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ ZLOOLQJQHVV WR REH\ DXWKRULWLHV EHFDXVH WKH\
believe that the potential costs of doing otherwise are too great (for example, being 
VDQFWLRQHGIRUGLVREHGLHQFH¶  
Legitimacy and Power in Prison 
As identified in Section B above, it is widely accepted that the potential for abuse of power, 
especially with minor infractions, necessitates that safeguards are required to protect the 
vulnerable in the unequal power relationship that exists in prisons. But although independent 
preventative mechanisms are required to avoid abuses of power, the evidence uncovered in 
this article suggests that there may be significant practical limits in their potential, and 
enhanced formal accountability is unlikely to be a sufficient condition for the promotion of 
full rights protection. Current theoretical debates on legitimacy may help comprehend those 
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limits. Within criminal justice, achieving legitimacy has come to be seen as an important goal 
for providers, in part because of the various costs and inefficiencies involved in enforcing 
order (Tyler 2006). But the concept of legitimacy entails more than procedural fairness and 
can be understood as capturing a broader political/cultural discussion about the appropriate 
and agreeable values for any given social structure (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; Loader and 
Sparks 2013; Costa 20167KXVµOHJLWLmacy and power are . . . two faces of the same problem. 
The content and strength of legitimating beliefs radically affects all parties in a system of 
power relations and only legitimate social arrangements generate normative commitments 
towards FRPSOLDQFH¶ (Sparks and Bottoms 1995, p.55). This expanded concept of legitimacy 
suggests a number of different strategies within which legitimacy can be secured. The 
tripartite model matches one strategy, an approach that Rosanvallon has referred to as the 
µOHJLWLPDF\ RI LPSDUWLDOLW\¶ FLWHG LQ /RDGHU DQG 6SDUNV  SS±26). This approach 
aspires to facilitate prisoners experiencing their detention as legitimate (Rogan 2014, p.6) and 
being capable of asserting their rights without resort to legal redress. But without supporting 
institutional designs, these bodies might equally be viewed as primarily a means of 
maintaining social order through soft forms of control which create the impression of 
impartiality, and thereby engender compliance and consent from prisoners (McCleery 1961, 
p.152). The pragmatic purpose of such an approach is to reduce the need for force to create 
order in prison (Jackson et al. 2010, p.6), the constant use of which ZRXOGEHµLQHIILFLHQW¶DQG
µPRUDOO\HWKLFDOO\DQGSUDFWLFDOO\H[KDXVWLQJ¶ (Bosworth 2007, p.81).  
Encouraging and Enabling Prisoners 
The above line of reasoning helps to rationalise the limitations of the tripartite model. 
Ultimately, however well-intentioned the personalities and agencies involved, it is a top-
down enterprise and is hindered by the institutional and cultural dynamics in prison. There is 
also a risk that the accountability framework put in place can be perceived as too 
cumbersome, weak, and hence meaningless to prisoners. It may be seen as a placebo, with the 
impression of independence from power-holders and authority to achieve redress without the 
capacity to effect meaningful change. Worse still, the tripartite model might be seen to have 
more to do with an instrumentalist motivation to maintain order through an approach that 
attempts to provide a semblance of justice, rather than delivering categorical gains on 
prisoner rights protection. Thus the tripartite model may give the impression of protecting 
SULVRQHUV¶ULJKWVEXWWKLVIXQFWLRQFRXOGEHWUXPSHG by embedded cultural understandings as 
to what is required to maintain social order. If correct, to overcome this barrier to the 
effectiveness of the tripartite model and to encourage meaningful engagement, alternative 
strategies will be necessary to promote legitimacy. This line of analysis connects to a 
theoretical framework of legitimacy posited by Loader and Sparks (2013) who apply 
5RVDQYDOORQ¶V  PRGHOV RI OHJLWLPDF\ WR FULPLQRORJ\ LQ RUGHU WR KLJKOLJKW WKH
importance of conceiving of legitimacy as a necessarily political enterprise. Likewise a series 
of recent studies have doubted the ability of procedural fairness alone to provide the 
foundations of legitimacy in any system (Costa 2016). The values that a system promotes 
should not be divorced from debates on legitimacy, as the acceptability of those values will 
impact on the perceptions of participants and stakeholders. It follows, therefore, that a 
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legitimate system should also be suitably reflexive, in terms of being capable of integrating 
the viewpoints of all participants and stakeholders into a genuine ongoing re-evaluation and 
reconfirmation of its values. Applied to the tripartite model, therefore, the concept of 
UHIOH[LYLW\ VXJJHVWV WKDW IRU SULVRQHUV¶ ULJKWV WR EH UHDOLVHG WKH FDSDFLW\ RI Whe dominant 
penal culture needs first to support more effectively prisoners in their interactions with formal 
accountability arrangements in order to help them participate in the shaping of its values. 
Perhaps, for instance, it is possible to promote empowerment by reconfiguring interaction 
with the tripartite model as a form of positive citizenship within the confines of prison walls. 
'UDZLQJ RQ +DUEHUPDV¶V  LGHD RI D GHOLEHUDWLYH GHPRFUDF\ engagement with these 
bodies might be interpreted as a civic activity and positively encouraged. Such a move would 
require the reconfiguring of power relations in prison, at least in the context of complaints. 
Only then could prisoners be encouraged to complain, both formally and informally, 
confident in the knowledge that the act of complaining will not result in any negative 
consequences. This approach might lead to more complaints being made, but dealt with as a 
rule informally, without recourse to the formal accountability framework. In turn, this might 
make the tripartite bodies more effective if they only have to deal with the more serious 
transgressions of rights. It might even reduce the need for professionalised structures in 
favour of facilitating individual and community agency within the prison community. A 
similar argument has been presented recently by Butler and Maruna (2016) in their study of 
prison adjudication of disciplinary matters. They argue that the process should be remodelled 
around restorative justice goals, rather than procedural formality, encouraging the prisoner to 
become a more active participant in the disciplinary process with a view to promoting a better 
understanding of the implications of their actions. To achieve a more deliberative 
environment, a model already exists that may be tweaked. In England and Wales, HM 
Inspectorate of Prisons (2012, p.1) has created four tests of a healthy prison: Safety, Respect, 
Purposeful DFWLYLW\ DQG 5HVHWWOHPHQW )RU SXUSRVHIXO DFWLYLW\ µSULVRQHUV DUH DEOH DQG 
expected, to engage in activity thaWLVOLNHO\WREHQHILWWKHP¶DQGIRUUHVHWWOHPHQWµSULVRQHUV 
are prepared for their release back into the community and effectively helped to reduce the 
OLNHOLKRRG RI UHRIIHQGLQJ¶ (QJDJLQJ ZLWK the tripartite bodies and other forms of 
organisational participation such as prison councils, could be considered in the category of 
purposeful activity and resettlement. The findings for the study of race relations in prisons by 
Cowburn and Lavis (2010) and the attitudes of both staff and prisoners to further engagement 
in prison programmes also offers valuable lessons for how such culture-changing strategies 
might be used to enhance the likelihood of prisoners engaging positively with formal prison 
structures. An additional forum that the complaints process might be linked into is the system 
of prisoner councils. Prisoner councils as part of a deliberative process ± and fulfilling the 
objectives of purposeful activity and resettlement ± give a voice to prisoners and offer 
opportunities for dialogue and to convey their views on prison conditions and treatment more 
generally (Bishop 2006, p.3). These are allowed under the 2006 EPR (Rule 50), and were 
SURPRWHGE\WKH:RROI5HSRUWDVPHDQVIRUSULVRQHUVµWRFRQWULEXWH to and be informed of the 
ZD\ WKLQJV DUH UXQ¶ :RROI, cited in Solomon and Edgar 2004, p.3). While a 2002 Prison 
Service Order in England and Wales states that they should not compromise good order or 
discipline, they have functioned with mixed results, depending, usually on the attitude of the 
local prison management. While personal and security issues are outside the remit of prisoner 
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councils, they offer prisoners an opportunity to participate in the governance of their 
community and engage in conflict resolution. Advocating for the more widespread adoption 
of prisoner councils, Solomon and Edgar (2004) concluded that they are more than just 
representative opportunities for prisoners but challenge society to see prisoners:  
in a new light, as citizens and individuals who have a right to make choices. Having a 
say about the conditions in which they are held and the politics that regulate their 
lives is a vital process of fostering personal responsibility. It is a recognition that 
prisoners are not powerless, but are members of a community which requires their 
consent if it is to exercise its authority legitimately. (p.35)  
E. Conclusion 
This article has problematised the limitations of the tripartite accountability framework that 
has built up around prisons in England and Wales, the Republic of Ireland, and Scotland, in 
WHUPVRILWVFDSDFLW\WRSURPRWHSULVRQHUV¶ULJKWV7KHDELOLW\RIWKHWULSDUWLWHPRGHOWRDIIHFW
future behaviour depends on the available resources of monitors and complaint-handlers, 
their willingness to use them and their capacity to influence prison managers and staff. But 
this article has utilised official reports emanating from the tripartite framework itself to 
suggest that these efforts, by themselves are likely to always hit a glass ceiling. It has also 
identified a need for more research to determine if prisoners experience the tripartite model as 
legitimate. In essence, from our analysis, legitimacy will be dependent on whether there is an 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO FXOWXUH WKDW IDFLOLWDWHV SULVRQHUV¶ FRPSODLQWV HPEUDFHV WKH OHDUQLQJ IURP WKese 
reports and is willing to use them to improve practice in the future. This implies that in 
addition to robust legal rights and access to accountability mechanisms, what is needed is a 
culture within prisons which allows for bottom-up drivers of rights-enhancing activity as well 
as top-down solutions. But this latter project entails a recognition 
that for the formal processes to be meaningful there must be enhanced acceptance of 
prisoners as agents even while confined in penal institutions. Given the nature of the prison 
community, this logically also implies a duty on prison services and the tripartite bodies to 
promote and encourage active agency of prisoners. This goal goes beyond the capacity of 
accountability bodies and binary judicial processes. If SULVRQHUV¶ULJKWVDUH to be safeguarded 
and upheld in full there is an urgent need to reframe our interpretation of prison governance. 
Controversially, this involves empowering prisoners in a rebalanced power dynamic in an 
institution in which the dominant form has been traditionally for the power to operate 
overwhelmingly on the side of the captors in contrast to the captives. 
 
Notes 
1 This article does not analyse the accountability structure in Northern Ireland prisons due to 
the distinct set of issues that a study of Northern Ireland prisons would raise. However, here 
too the model of independent ombudsman is being promoted (Northern Ireland Justice Act, 
Part 2).  
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